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Action  
IOControl: 7  
Rec'd: November 1, 1962  
1:16 a.m.

Info

FROM: New York

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1584, November 1, 1 a.m.

PRIORITY

DEPT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

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UPON RETURN SYG PARTY TO NEW YORK PLANE MET BY NOYES AND WELLBORN WHO DISCUSSED WITH RIKHYE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CONFERENCES IN CUBA. ASKED RIKHYE BASIS OF MESSAGE HE HAD SENT THRU NARASIMHAN THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS THURSDAY WOULD RECEIVE WARM RECEPTION. RIKHYE STATED THIS BASED ON CUBAN STATEMENT THAT WOULD RESIST ANY VIOLATION THEIR AIR SPACE. RIKHYE RECOMMENDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS UNTIL SATURDAY BECAUSE GEN. IGOR STAZENKO, COMMANDER OF SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA, STATED ALL MISSILES AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AT LAUNCHING SITES WOULD BE REMOVED BY FRIDAY. SUGGESTED THAT AT ANY TIME FLIGHTS RESUMED PATTERN OF FLIGHTS SHOULD BE VARIED SINCE CUBANS BELIEVED THEY HAD ESTABLISHED WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE THE STANDARD ROUTINE FOR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS.

RIKHYE OBSERVED HEAVY CONCENTRATION ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AROUND AIRFIELD AT WHICH SYG PLANE LANDED BUT DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY OBSERVE ELSEWHERE.

HE STATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBANS AND SOVIETS "UNBELIEVABLY BAD" AND THAT CUBANS FELT THAT SOVIETS HAD TAKEN VARIOUS ACTIONS OF CONCERN TO CUBANS WITHOUT CONSULTING OR EVEN INFORMING THEM. HE SAID WHEN SUBJECT OF INSPECTION OF MISSILE SITES RAISED AN UNNAMED CUBAN TOLD HIM UN REFS COULD NOT INSPECT THEM, THAT EVEN THE CUBANS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO DO SO.

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-2- November 1, 1 a.m., from New York

RIKHYE HELD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GEN STAZENKO DURING WHICH HE WAS TOLD NONE OF IRBMS HAD BECOME OPERATIONAL BUT THAT SIX OR EIGHT OF MRBM HAD BEEN OPERATIONAL. SAID THAT ALL MISSILES HAD NOT YET ARRIVED IN CUBA BUT NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HOW MANY STILL TO COME. SAID RIKHYE'S INFORMATION ON TOTAL NUMBERS (WHICH BASED ON MAPS AND PHOTOS PROVIDED BY US) WAS ABOUT CORRECT. SAID ABOUT FIVE THOUSAND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA. CIVILIANS WHO WERE PRINCIPALLY LABORERS BROUGHT TOTAL SOVIET PERSONNEL TO BETWEEN EIGHT AND TEN THOUSAND. STAZENKO INDICATED THAT ALL SOVIETS IN CUBA UNDER HIS CONTROL. HE STATED THAT AFTER MISSILES AND MAJOR COMPONENTS REMOVED FROM SITES, MIGHT BE SOME "BITS AND PIECES" LEFT AT SITES BUT THAT THEY EXPECTED START "BULLDOZING" THEM BY FRIDAY. SOME TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR CRATING MISSILES AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT. STAZENKO EXPECTED LEAVE CUBA WITH LAST OF HIS EQUIPMENT. STAZENKO SHOWED LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. RIKHYE APPEARED CONVINCED OF GOOD FAITH AND RELIABILITY OF STAZENKO.

RIKHYE WOULD NOT SAY CATEGORICALLY WHETHER HE THOUGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS UNDER SOVIET CONTROL WOULD FIRE ON RECONNAISSANCE PLANES BUT WAS EMPHATIC THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THOSE UNDER CUBAN CONTROL WOULD DO SO. UNABLE OBTAIN FROM HIM PRECISE STATEMENT AS TO WHICH WEAPONS UNDER CUBAN AND WHICH UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

RIKHYE'S FINAL STATEMENT WAS THAT HE WAS "VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED" WHICH SEEMED TO BE BASED ON HIS ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS RATHER THAN CUBAN INTENTIONS.

STEVENSON

JVC

NOTE: Passed White House, 11/1/62, 1:30 a.m. RNL

Advance copy to SS, SS-O and INR (TEM)

Relayed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS-O

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